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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RELIANCE NATIONAL ) 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Case No. 
vs. ) 10,003 
\VILLIAM P. HANSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. ) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Reliance National Life Insurance Company, plain-
tiff in the lower court, appealed from a judgement, of the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
granting defendant William P. Hansen "no cause of action" 
from the plaintiff's claim and, further, granting defend-
ant's counterclaim for monies due him by virtue of an 
additional contract of employment for commissions 
earned and for the sale of an airplane by the defendant 
to the plaintiff. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court, resulting in a judg~ 
ment for the defendant of"no cause of action on plaintiff's 
complaint" and the awarding of $3,500.00 on two separate 
counts of defendant's counterclaim, from which the plain-
tiff appeals. The Court further found that the portion of 
the original contract dealing with the sale of the airplane 
was severable from the contract as a whole; that subse-
quent commissions were earned aftertheoriginalcontract 
of employment was terminated. The plaintiff appeals on 
the grounds that the judgement of the lower court is not 
supported by the Findings of Fact. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, being defendant in the lower court, seeks 
to uphold the judgment of the lower court granting the 
"no cause of action" on plaintiff's complaint and the award 
in favor of the defendant on two separate counts of de-
fendant's counterclaim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent accepts the appellant's Statement of 
Facts as outlined in "Plaintiff's Brief' as being in sub-
stantial conformity with the Findings of Fact entered by 
the Court, with the following exceptions: 
1. The defendant presented evidence which showed 
that the plaintiff did not take diligent care to inquire into 
the background and history of the defendant when the 
plaintiff had opportunity of ascertaining such back-
ground of the defendant, and the defendant requested 
the plaintiff to do so. 
2. Respondent does not admit hereby that the rep-
resentations charged to respondent were false; and fur-
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ther, respondent does not agree that appellant has suf-
fered any damage by reason thereof. 
Respondent feels that although appellant has divided 
its argument into three points, all three points in reality 
relate to the same legal principles. Therefore, respondent 
will not answer appellant's arguments point by point, 
but will answer all points raised in "Plaintiff's Brief'' 
under Point II hereof. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT 
WAS NOT TERMINATED BECAUSE OF ANY MIS-
REPRESENTATION BUT WAS TERMINATED ON 
OTHER GROUNDS, and THEREFORE NO DAM-
AGES NOR RESCISSION FOR FRAUD OR MISREP-
RESENTATION CAN BE CLAIMED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
RULED THAT THE CONTRACT FOR THE SALE 
OF THE AIRPLANE, and DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 
FOR COMMISSIONS WERE SEVERABLE FROM THE 
BASIC CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT 
\VAS NOT TERMINATED BECAUSE OF ANY MIS-
REPRESENTATION BUT WAS TERMINATED ON 
OTHER GROUNDS, AND THEREFORE NO DAM-
AGES NOR RESCISSION FOR FRAUD OR MISREP-
RESENTATION CAN BE CLAIMED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
The trial court's Findings of Fact No. 9 set forth 
the reason for which defendant's employment contract 
was terminated by plaintiff as follows: 
"9. The contract of employment between plaintiff and 
defendant, as set forth in Finding of Fact No. B. 
was terminated by plaintiff for cause due to the 
following acts of the defendant: 
a. The defendant was directed to sell the afore-
said airplane and made no effort to do so. 
b. The defendant was instructed not to approach 
the insurance department of the State of Idaho in 
regard to the Estate Accumulator Policy. Never-
theless, the defendant did consult with that depart-
ment with negative results totheprejudiceofplaintiff. 
c. Defendant was instructed not to sell a partici-
pating policy which was being designed by plaintiff 
until the policy had been approved by plaintiff's 
actuary. Nevertheless, defendant proceeded to sell 
this policy before approval from the actuary was 
obtained. 
d. Defendant was instructed not to control any 
insurance department regarding approval of the 
Estate Accumulator policy, but to leave this matter 
in the hands of the actuary for plaintiff. Neverthe-
less, defendant wrote the Insurance Commissioner 
of the State of Washington regarding approval of 
this policy with adverse results to plaintiff. 
e. Defendant was instructed not to use the com-
pany airplane for personal business, but neverthe-
less did use the airplane for personal business. 
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This finding clearly shows that the plaintiff did not 
terminate the defendant's contract because of fraud or 
any alleged misrepresentation but rather on other 
grounds. 'rherefore, the lower court was correct in deny-
ing the plaintiff damages or rescission on the grounds 
of fraud, inasmuch as fraud was not alleged nor found 
to be related to the cause of the termination of the 
employment contract. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
HULED THAT THE CONTRACT FOR THE SALE 
OF THE AIRPLANE, AND DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 
FOR COMMISSIONS WERE SEVERABLE FROM 
THE BASIC CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. 
In its brief appellant cites the case of Taylor vs. 
Moore, et al, 51 P.2d 222, 87 Utah 493, and contends 
that it stands for the proposition that a contract in-
duced by fraud is voidable at the option of the party 
injured by the fraud. However, this reflects only a 
portion of the holding in that case, and was taken 
out of context. Further reading of the Taylor case 
~hows that the Court held that a person who has the 
opportunity of knowing facts constituting alleged fraud 
cannot be inactive and afterwards allege want of know-
ledge arising by reason of his negligence or laches. 
In this case, the evidence clearly shows that the plain-
tiff, or its president, Salisbury, did not investigate de-
fendant's references. AssetforthinFindingofFact No.4: 
" . . . Salisbury made no search of defendant's 
past record." Further, from Salisbury's testimony at 
trial, and the testimony of the defendant, it appears 
that Salisbury had opportunity to check into the back-
ground of the defendant and was implored to do so by 
the defendant himself. It seems then, the plaintiff did 
not exercise diligent care to check into the background 
of the defendant Hansen, and thereby is guilty of 
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laches and precluded from later raising this objectic, 
against the defendant. This also seems implicit in th\ 
findings of the trial court that defendant was dis barged 
for cause, and not by reason of any misrepresentations 
made at the time of his employment. 
It is interesting to note that the Taylor c.ase, as 
cited by the appellant, is quite explicit on the duties of 
the person complaining of fraud to investigate facts 
constituting the alleged fraud. Therefore, the trial court's 
finding in Finding of Fact No. 5, that Salisbury did 
not know until three months later of any misrepre-
sentations, is indicative of the plaintiff's inaction and 
negligence in checking on the representations of the 
defendant. 
Notwithstanding the fact that fraud might be found 
in the basic employment contract, the question that is 
foremost before this Court is whether or not such fraud 
affected the agreement for the sale of the airplane and 
the payment of the defendant of commissions earned 
subsequent to the termination of the basic employment 
contract. There have been several tests outlined by the 
courts and legal texts to determine whether or not 
portions of contracts are severable and whether, if the 
contracts are found to be severable, fraud in one portion 
would travel to other portions of the contracts. The 
general rule seems to be that the tests for severability 
evolve upon intention, divisibility of subject matter, and 
apportionment of consideration (See 17 A Corpus Juris 
Secundum, Contracts Sees. 331-335.) With respect to the 
instant case each test is met as follows: 
1. Intention: It is clear from the evidence that the 
intention was to make a separate contract for the 
sale of the airplane on terms different from the 
defendant's employment contract. This is evidenced 
by the fact that from the outset plaintiff was in-
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terested in the possibility of re-sale of this aircraft, 
even though its intention was that the defendant 
would still be working for plaintiff. Therefore, it 
appears that the intention of both the plaintiff and 
thtl defendant was that the disposition of the air-
craft would not automatically terminate defend-
ant's employment contract with plaintiff. Thus, the 
parties clearly intended the contract to be severable. 
(See Baker vs. Jones, 240 P. 2d 1165, 1171; 69 
Wyo. 314.) 
2. Divisibility of Subject Matter: It is clear from the 
record that the plaintiff and defendant were dealing 
with two different subject matters, to wit: insurance 
sales vis-a-vis the sale of an airplane. The case of 
Coppedge vs. Leiser, 229 P. 2d 977, 71 Ida. 248, 
outlines the divisibility of subject matter as a valid 
test to determine the severability of portions of a 
contract. It is clear from the record that this con-
tract in question meets the tests of divisibility of 
subject matter, and therefore the sale of the airplane 
and the commissions paid are severable from the 
basic employment contract. 
3. The Apportionment of Consideration and Method 
of Payment: The rule that where a contract calls for 
a different mode of payment or an apportionment 
of consideration among different parties, schedule 
of payment or apportionment is a valid criteria upon 
which to base a decision that portions of the contract 
are severable from one another. In the cases of 
Simmons vs. California Institute of Technology, 
209 P. 2d 589, 34 C. 2d 264, and Sweet vs. Wat-
son's Nurseries, 73 P. 2d 284, 23 Cal. App 379, 
the test was outlined whereby apportionment of 
consideration was used to determine that portions 
of interests were severable. Applying this to the 
present case, the basic employment contract called 
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for one means of compensation for the purchase 
of the aircraft, to and including continued pay-
ments to a third party for future payments on the 
aircraft, and a separate means of compensation 
to the defendant for duties as a Sales Manager. 
As to the sale of policies after termination of the 
basic employment contract, still another method 
of compensation and mode of payment was devsed. 
It is the respondent's argument that, based upon 
the tests as outlined above and the tests as outlined in 
12 Am. Jur. Contracts 315-316, the case at hand clearly 
fits within the rule that even though an agreement em-
brace several particulars about one affair and be reached 
through one agreement, it may yet have the nature and 
operation of several different contracts and be treated 
as severable portions of a basic contract. U. S. vs. 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 315 U. S. 389, 86 L. ed. 
855, 62 S. Ct. 581. 
Since the agreements pertaining to the sale of the 
airplane and to the commissions earned after term-
ination of the employment contract are severable from 
the basic employment contract, any fraud that may 
exist with respect to the basic employment contract 
does not carry over and apply to the severable portions. 
Any misrepresentation as to the basic contract was not 
material as to the severable portions, and therefore 
should not apply so as to make voidable those portions 
of the contract dealing with the sale of the airplane 
and the commissions earned. (See Hecht vs. Metzler, 
14 Utah 408, 48 Pac. 37.) 
Furthermore, there was no fraud proved or even 
alleged in the lower court as to the sale of the airplane. 
In light of the case of U. S. vs. Arrendondo, 6 Pet. 
(U.S.) 691, 8 L. ed. 547, the fraud must be relevant 
to the subject matter of the contract in order to apply. 
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With respect to the $1,000.00 awarded respondent 
for commissions earned subsequent to the termination 
of respondent's employment contract, respondent asserts 
that appellant has accepted the benefits of sales giving 
rise to the commissions and that to permit appellant to 
defeat respondent's claim thereto by reason of some 
unrelated misrepresentations will unjustly enrich appel-
lant. The trial court found the amount of commissions 
earned subsequent to the termination of the basic em-
ployment contract to be $1,000.00. This is supported 
by evidence in the record, as set forth in the extract 
quoted on page 18 of appellant's brief. It is true that 
appellant presented conflicting evidence. However, ap-
pellant did not object to respondent's testimony and the 
trial judge chose to believe the evidence of the defendant 
supporting this amount. The respondent believes the 
fmdings of the trial judge, that the amount in dispute 
was actually $1,000.00 owed to the defendant, should 
be upheld on the ground that the trial judge was in the 
best position to observe and determine the reliability of 
the witnesses and the accuracy of the evidence offered 
by them. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully submits, that the fmd-
ings and decisions of the lower court were reasonable 
and in accordance with law; and further submits that 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law should 
be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TUFT AND MARSHALL 
GEORGE SMITH DIBBLE, JR., of Counsel 
Attorneys for Respondent-Defendant 
53 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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